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The purpose of this paper is to explore audit quality in nonprofit healthcare organizations by 
investigating differences in audit report outcomes. Specifically, we examine the relationship 
between auditor type and auditor-disclosed internal control exceptions in Circular A-133 
audits of U.S. nonprofit healthcare organizations. Our findings indicate audits of nonprofit 
healthcare organizations conducted by the Big Four CPA firms carry a lower likelihood of 
disclosing internal control exceptions (i.e., reportable conditions and material weaknesses) 
than are audits conducted by smaller CPA firms. This challenges the general contention from 
prior studies that the Big Four firms are better audit quality providers and indicates that the 
alleged superiority of Big Four firms in terms of audit quality may not be generalizable to all 
industry sectors.  
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2 
Auditor Type and Audit Quality Differences in Nonprofit  




In the wake of continued corporate scandals in the for-profit arena, the pressure 
for increased accountability within the nonprofit sector in the United States (U.S.) is 
growing.  In an effort to increase transparency, U.S. federal and state regulators question 
whether nonprofit organizations continue to meet the needs of the community through 
charitable programs (Smith et al., 2009; Smith and Edmonds, 2009).  According to U.S. 
Senator Chuck Grassley, it is important for nonprofits to ‗keep their trust with the 
American people‘ since many of the problems within nonprofit organizations are based 
upon poor governance or ‗failure to abide to best practices‘ (U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance, 2004).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), though applicable only to publicly-
traded companies, has highlighted a need for better governance and compliance in the 
nonprofit sector.  Similar concerns for quality and transparency also exist on an 
international level, with a recent emphasis on standards for better governance.  For 
example, the International Committee on Fundraising Organizations (ICFO) suggests 
nonprofit organizations develop good governance practices in order to improve 
accountability in the nonprofit sector at an international level (ICFO, 2008).  Ellwood 
(2008) points out that accountability and transparency within the U.K. healthcare sector is 
greatly affected by the choice of accounting method.   
Emphasis on compliance in the nonprofit setting has influenced healthcare 
organizations to concentrate on methods to improve their reporting transparency and 
accountability (Troyer et al., 2004).  Hospitals are of particular interest since healthcare- 
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related expenditures accounted for over 16.2% (i.e., $2.2 trillion) of the U.S. gross 
domestic product in 2007 (American Hospital Association, 2009).  Public charity health 
organizations, which account for over 14% of all public charities, generated over $673 
billion in revenue and held over $826 billion in assets in 2005 (Blackwood et al., 2008).  
Possibly due to their impact on the U.S. economy, federal regulators have recently called 
attention to the need for increased oversight in healthcare organizations.   
One critical aspect of U.S. federal oversight of nonprofit healthcare organizations 
is the administration of federal agency awards.  Nonprofit healthcare organizations that 
spend more than $500,000 in federal awards are required to meet the audit and internal 
control requirements of Circular A-133 of the Single Audit Act of 1984 (OMB, 2003).  
The quality of Circular A-133 audits has been debated for decades, beginning with a 
1986 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, which asserted that 34 
percent of audits of federal programs reviewed were significantly inadequate (GAO, 
1986).  More recently, the GAO emphasized the need for proposed reforms that may help 
increase the Single Audit Act‘s ability to ensure the effective oversight of federally 
funded programs.  These reforms include actions to address whether auditors adequately 
respond to internal control issues and comply with government auditing standards (GAO, 
2006).  In a related report, the GAO also highlights the existence of continuing 
deficiencies related to the documentation and testing of internal controls in federal audits 
(GAO, 2007).  In particular, this latter report also notes persistent deficiencies among 
audits performed by non-governmental auditors.  As a result, the GAO concludes that 
audit quality remains an unresolved issue, particularly among the smaller public 
accounting firms (GAO, 2007).  Smieliauskas et al. (2008) also raise audit quality  
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concerns, but from the perspective of the audit report. They argue that current audit 
reports fail to adequately address true accounting risks and should directly disclose 
judgments about risk and materiality. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate audit quality within U.S. nonprofit 
healthcare organizations.  We rely on audit outcomes from Circular A-133 audits as our 
measure of audit quality.  Specifically, we look at auditors‘ ability to detect and report 
existing internal control exceptions as a proxy measure of audit quality.  Audit quality in 
Circular A-133 audits is documented in prior literature, but previous studies do not focus 
particularly on the healthcare sector (e.g., Brown and Raghunandan, 1995; Jakubowski, 
1995; Jakubowski et al., 2002; López and Peters, 2010).  Expanding upon prior audit 
quality research in the nonprofit sector, we analyse whether differences in audit outcomes 
of nonprofit healthcare organizations exist among certified public accountant firms 
(hereafter, CPA firms) of various sizes.  The U.S. healthcare industry has seen 
tremendous growth over the past decade and, with the advent of increased oversight 
measures, this investigation is timely and pertinent.   
Our cross-sectional sample of 1,191 single audit reports of nonprofit healthcare 
entities from 2004 to 2008 indicates that the Big Four CPA firms are less likely to 
disclose reportable conditions and material weaknesses than are smaller CPA firms.  
Prior research in the for-profit setting generally finds that Big Four auditors are better 
quality providers (DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic and Stein, 1987; Lennox, 1999; Francis, 
2004) and studies in the nonprofit sector, particularly on city and county-level 
governmental audits, find that the Big Four auditors are improving in the quality of their 
audits (Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; López and Peters, 2010).  Our findings challenge  
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these claims of improved audit quality among the Big Four CPA firms and provide 
evidence that the alleged superiority of the Big Four firms maybe not be generalizable to 
all industry sectors.  Nonprofit healthcare organizations compose a unique sector that has 
been almost completely overlooked by the audit quality literature.  The distinctive 
operating structure of nonprofit healthcare organizations, joined to their mission of 
advancing the common good in healthcare, requires auditors to approach their audits 
differently and to apply methods that are industry-specific.  Thus, the availability of 
auditors who can provide such services may be limited in some circumstances and 
dependent upon the size and complexity of the operations of the organization (Panel on 
the Nonprofit Sector, 2005).  Further research in the nonprofit healthcare industry is 
needed to fully understand the unique governance and reporting conditions of this distinct 
sector.  Our study supports the call for research on governance in nonprofit entities and 
contributes to the existing literature on audit quality in nonprofit organizations (Keating 
et al., 2005; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Smith and Edmonds, 2009; López and Peters, 
2010). 
The paper is organized as follows: we first we present a literature review that 
includes a discussion of audit quality research in the nonprofit sector.  Next, we discuss 
the Single Audit Act and Circular A-133 audits in more detail.  Our methodology and 
sample selection procedures are presented in the next section followed by a discussion of 
the results.  The last section provides concluding remarks. 
Literature Review 
Circular A-133 audit outcomes have been used in prior studies to investigate 
issues related to audit quality, compliance, and governance.  For instance, Keating et al.  
 
6 
(2005) discover that smaller nonprofit organizations have more difficulty complying with 
Circular A-133‘s audit requirements and tend to engage smaller CPA firms for their 
audits.  They also find that the audits of healthcare organizations disclose the most 
reportable conditions and going concern issues than the audits of any other type of 
nonprofit entity.  Pridgen and Wang (2008) also rely on Circular A-133 audit outcomes to 
discover that nonprofit hospitals with audit committees have better internal control 
procedures concerning the administration of their federal programs.  The findings in 
Pridgen and Wang (2008) provide early evidence that proper administration of federal 
programs is critical to the nonprofit healthcare sector. 
Prior research in the for-profit setting generally finds that Big Four auditors are 
better quality providers than are smaller CPA firms (DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic and Stein, 
1987; Lennox, 1999; Francis, 2004). Studies in the nonprofit sector, however, find 
conflicting evidence on the relationship between auditor type (e.g., Big N versus non-Big 
N) and audit quality.  For instance, using a sample of U.S. cities and counties Jakubowski 
(1995) investigates audit quality among governmental and non-governmental auditors, 
and finds differences in the frequency of reported internal control weaknesses across 
auditor types (small, large, and governmental auditors).  In particular, the results of his 
study indicate that governmental auditors report more internal control weaknesses than 
any other CPA firm group (Jakubowski, 1995).  Similarly, Brown and Raghunandan 
(1995) find that state and local auditors may provide higher quality audits than CPA 
firms, possibly due to lower levels of litigation risk faced by CPA firms when conducting 
government audits.  Unlike for-profit entities that focus on the profit maximization goals 
of shareholders, nonprofit organizations are subject to a non-distribution constraint and  
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need to maintain a focus on preserving the mission of the organization (Hansmann, 
1980).  This emphasis on program service activities among nonprofit organizations may 
lead to different levels of litigation risk for CPAs firms when auditing nonprofit entities 
(Hardiman et al., 1987; Wilson et al., 2007; Vermeer, 2008).  As such, differences in 
audit quality could also arise.   
In a more recent study López and Peters (2010) examine audit quality using a 
sample of Circular A-133 audits of U.S. cities and counties.  In contrast to Jakubowski 
(1995) and Brown and Raghunandan (1995), the researchers find evidence indicating that 
the Big Four CPA firms provide better quality audits than governmental auditors and than 
smaller CPA firms in the years following the enactment of SOX.  Despite the fact that 
SOX regulations only apply to publicly-traded entities, López and Peters (2010) provide 
early evidence that the structural changes introduced by SOX may have had cascading 
effects that helped improve the performance of Big Four auditors in audits of the 
nonprofit sector.  Did these SOX-induced improvements in audit quality affect the 
performance of the Big Four firms in all types of audits?  Or, are these improvements in 
the performance of Big Four auditors industry sector-specific?  We explore audit quality 
in Circular A-133 audits of nonprofit healthcare organizations in an attempt to investigate 
whether the empirical findings of a positive relationship between auditor size and audit 
quality documented by recent studies apply to the healthcare sector.  
The Single Audit Act and Circular A-133 
Title 31 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 75 requires non-federal entities that expend 
federal awards to have a single audit, where the term ―non-federal entities‖ includes 
nonprofit organizations and other bodies of state or local governments.  In particular,  
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nonprofit organizations are defined as ―any corporation, trust, association, cooperative, or 
other organization that: (a) is operated primarily for scientific, educational, service, 
charitable, or similar purposes in the public interest; (b) is not organized primarily for 
profit; and (c) uses net proceeds to maintain, improve, or expand the operations of the 
organization‖ (Title 31, V, Chapter 75, Section 7501(a)(14)).  Nonprofit hospitals and 
other healthcare organizations fit this definition.    
The Single Audit Act of 1984 (SAA) requires that either a single or program-
specific audit be conducted for governmental and nonprofit entities that spend more than 
$100,000 in federal awards during a fiscal year (U.S. Congress, 1984); this threshold has 
since increased to expenditures of more than $500,000 for fiscal years ending after 
December 31, 2003 (OMB, 2003).  Prior to the enactment of the SAA, audits were 
conducted on a grant-by-grant basis.  Thus, the SAA improved the consistency of the 
audits and required disclosures of compliance with applicable regulations and internal 
control deficiencies.  Circular A-133 of the Office of Management and Budget details the 
specific reporting requirements and responsibilities of nonprofit organizations subject to 
the provisions of the SAA.  Entities subject to examination must (1) maintain internal 
control over federal programs, (2) manage federal awards to ensure compliance with 
regulations and provisions of the contract agreement, and (3) prepare appropriate 
financial statements, including a schedule of expenditures of federal awards (OMB, 
2003). 
Auditors performing Circular A-133 audits are required to determine whether the 
schedule of expenditures of federal awards is presented fairly in all material respects in 
relation to the financial statements when taken as a whole.  According to the American  
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), auditors are also required to perform 
tests that demonstrate an understanding of the recipient‘s internal controls in order to 
support a ‗low assessed risk‘ for these audits (AICPA, 2005).  The examination of 
internal controls includes assessing control risk and performing tests of controls.  Recent 
work by Srivastava et al. (2009) documents the importance of fraud risk assessments 
conducted by auditors.  Circular A-133 indicates that the internal control systems of 
federal fund recipients should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that: (1) 
transactions are properly recorded and accounted for; (2) transactions are executed in 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and (3) funds, property, and other 
assets are safeguarded against loss from unauthorized use or disposition (OMB, 2003).  
The audit report must disclose reportable conditions in internal controls noted during the 
audit.  Circular A-133 audits must also indicate whether the reportable conditions noted, 
if any, should be deemed as a material weakness.  Furthermore, auditors must ascertain, 
through review and testing procedures, whether the recipient has complied with laws, 
regulations and grant agreements (AICPA, 2005).   
Despite constant efforts to improve the effectiveness of the single audit process, 
several criticisms concerning the quality of Circular A-133 audits still exist.  For 
example, a GAO report in 2006 stated that ‗while the Single Audit Act has provided 
oversight of more than $300 billion in annual federal grants, questions have been raised 
about the usefulness and effectiveness of oversight for federal funds‘ (GAO, 2006).  
Empirical research also supports concerns over audit quality in U.S. government audits, 
as evidenced by studies disclosing significant audit quality differences in audits 
performed by different types of auditors (Copley and Doucet, 1993; Brown and  
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Raghunandan, 1995; Jakubowski, 1995; Jakubowski et al., 2002; López and Peters, 
2010).  This study seeks to investigate whether these criticisms are valid in the U.S. 
nonprofit healthcare sector.   
Methodology and Sample Selection 
Our analysis is based on data obtained from the Single Audit Clearinghouse of the 
U.S. Census Bureau (http://harvester.census.gov/sac/).  The Clearinghouse maintains a 
comprehensive database of single audit results that include details about recipient entities, 
federal award amounts, and the auditors‘ report.  Our sample is composed of single audit 
reports of U.S. nonprofit healthcare organizations for fiscal years 2004 to 2008 and 
includes entities in the 48 contiguous U.S. states, Alaska, and Hawaii.  Our search 
procedures identify 1,209 records, from which we remove 18 observations audited by 
governmental auditors.  The final sample consists of 1,191 cross-sectional entity-year 
observations and 364 different nonprofit healthcare organizations represented in the 
sample. 
We build on the existing literature in the audit quality arena to build our 
regression model as follows: 
Prob (INDEX) =  β0 + β1BIG4_CPAit + β2SIZEit + β3LOW_RISKit + β4MAJORit 
+ β5COG_AGENCYit + β6CLIENTSit + β7NEW_AUDITORit   
+ δkFUNDING_SOURCEk + λjYEARj + εit 
 
where i indicates the nonprofit healthcare organization and t indicates fiscal year.  Our 
dependent variable, INDEX, represents whether the Circular A-133 audit report discloses 
internal control exceptions.  In particular, this variable equals zero if the audit discloses 
no internal control exceptions; one if the audit discloses at least one reportable condition 
but no material weaknesses; and, two if at least one of the reportable conditions disclosed  
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by the audit is also classified as a material weakness.  Generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) require auditors to identify internal control exceptions that have the 
potential to adversely affect the integrity of the reporting process as reportable conditions 
and exceptions with a greater likelihood of affecting the reporting process as material 
weaknesses.  According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality is the probability that an 
auditor will detect and report a breach in the client‘s accounting system.  Thus, INDEX 
serves as a proxy for audit quality since audits conducted by better audit quality providers 
should carry a higher likelihood of disclosing any existing internal control exceptions.  
We use ordered logit regression to estimate our regression model given that our 
dependent variable conditions on one or three different values with an intrinsic logical 
order.   
The independent variable of interest, BIG4_CPA, is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the audit is performed by a Big Four CPA firm (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero otherwise.  Prior studies 
generally find that Big Four auditors are better audit quality providers than any other 
auditor group.  However, we express no expectations in terms of the direction of the 
estimated regression coefficient for the BIG4_CPA variable, given the lack of prior 
empirical evidence on the performance of the CPA firms on Circular A-133 audits of the 
nonprofit healthcare sector.  The regression model includes controls for client- and 
auditor-specific factors known to affect the incidence and disclosure of internal control 
exceptions; we also include controls for the fixed effects of time.       
SIZE is the log of total federal funds received by the nonprofit healthcare entity.  
This variable is intended to control for the complexities associated with larger audit  
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engagements and is intended to proxy for potentially omitted variables (Davidson and 
New, 1993; Becker et al., 1998).  To comply with Circular A-133 requirements auditors 
are allowed to classify certain clients as low risk, which decreases the required percentage 
of program expenditures that must be audited.  LOW_RISK is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the auditor classifies the auditee as low risk, zero otherwise.  We also 
include a control for the proportion of an organization‘s total federal awards that the 
auditor classifies as major program, MAJOR.  Under the stipulations of Circular A-133, 
major programs are those that are larger in size or carry higher levels of risk.  Thus, 
entities with larger proportions of federal funds classified as major program require 
additional audit efforts.   
The Office of Management and Budget assigns a cognizant agency to entities that 
spend more than $50 million a year in federal awards.  COG_AGENCY is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the auditee is assigned a cognizant agency, zero 
otherwise.  Cognizant agencies are expected to conduct quality reviews and provide 
technical advice to fund recipients and their auditors, therefore decreasing the likelihood 
of internal control exceptions.  Following Deis and Giroux (1992), CLIENTS is 
operationalized as the number of Circular A-133 audits of nonprofit healthcare 
organizations performed by the auditor.  This variable is intended to control for the 
potential effects of industry expertise on the likelihood of disclosing existing internal 
control exceptions.  NEW_AUDITOR is an indicator variable that controls for whether 
this is the first year that the auditor performs the audit.  Prior studies indicate that longer 
auditor tenures are associated with higher audit quality (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003).  Thus, NEW_AUDITOR is intended to control  
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for potential impact of new clients on auditors‘ ability to detect and report existing 
internal control exceptions.    
We also include a matrix of indicator variables that identify the different U.S. 
federal agencies providing funds to the entities in our sample (FUNDING_SOURCE).  
These indicator variables control for potential differences in oversight and monitoring 
efforts of different U.S. federal funding agencies.  We include controls for the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Education (EDU), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HEALTH), and other federal government 
agencies (OTHER).  Finally, YEAR is a matrix of indicator variables that control for 
temporal differences that may affect the occurrence of reportable conditions and material 
weaknesses. 
Results and Discussion 
The univariate results of this study are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 
depicts descriptive statistics for three different subsample groups generated on the basis 
of the severity of the internal control exceptions disclosed by the Circular A-133 audits in 
the sample.  The first group includes audits that do not report internal control exceptions 
(INDEX = 0); the second group includes audits that disclose at least one reportable 
condition but no material weaknesses (INDEX = 1); and, the third and final group 
includes audits that disclose at least one material weakness (INDEX = 2).  In addition, we 
present descriptive statistics for all observations in the sample in the last set of columns 
on this table.    
 
14 
As shown by the average values of the variable SIZE, audits increase in size as 
one moves from audits with no exceptions to audits disclosing reportable conditions.  
However, audits with reportable conditions that also disclose material weaknesses (i.e., 
INDEX = 2) appear to be smaller in average than any of the audits in other subsample 
groups.  LOW_RISK shows that there is a marked continuous decrease on the likelihood 
of a low risk auditee designation as one moves from audits with no exceptions to audits 
disclosing material weaknesses.  This supports the notion that riskier audits are more 
likely to disclose internal control exceptions.  Similarly, the average values for the 
variable MAJOR increase as one moves from audits with no exceptions to audits 
disclosing material weaknesses, signifying an increasing relationship between the 
proportion of funds in the audit classified as major program and the likelihood that the 
audit will disclose internal control exceptions.       
Note that none of the entities with auditor reports disclosing material weaknesses 
(i.e., INDEX = 2) was assigned a cognizant agency.  Thus, the designation of a cognizant 
agency to overlook the operations of an auditee seems to be an effective measure in the 
curtailment of material weaknesses, the most serious kind of internal control exceptions.  
The average value of the variable CLIENTS increases as one moves from audits with no 
exceptions to audits disclosing reportable conditions, potentially indicating that the 
ability of auditors to detect and report internal control exceptions increases as the amount 
of other Circular A-133 audits of nonprofit healthcare organizations in their clients set 
increases.  Lastly, as presented in the last set of columns in this table, 86.5 percent of all 
entities in the sample received funds from the Department of Health, making this agency 
the most common provider of federal funds among nonprofit healthcare organizations.    
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  Table 2 presents the proportion of Circular A-133 audits with reportable 
conditions and material weaknesses by auditor type.  Out of a total of 1,191 observations, 
16.54 percent of the audits disclosed at least one reportable condition and 24.87 percent 
of audits with reportable conditions also disclosed at least one material weakness.  
Results by auditor type reveal that audits conducted by the Big Four auditors display a 
slightly higher proportion of reports with reportable conditions than audits conducted by 
smaller CPA firms (16.64 percent versus 16.40 percent, respectively).  A similar pattern 
emerges for audits with reportable conditions; 26.96 percent of audits performed by the 
Big Four CPA firms with reportable conditions also disclose materials weaknesses, while 
only 21.95 percent of the audits performed by the smaller CPA firms with reportable 
conditions also disclose material weaknesses.  A test of difference in population 
proportions indicates that the difference in this latter set of proportions is statistically 
significant (p-value < .049).  In sum, the univariate result in Table 2 presents evidence 
that, while the proportion of audits disclosing reportable conditions seem to be about the 
same for all auditor groups, the proportion of audits disclosing material weaknesses is 
higher among audits performed by the Big Four auditors.   
  In an untabulated analysis of the data presented in Table 2 we eliminated audits 
conducted by larger, non-Big Four auditors, also known as second-tier auditors, from the 
Small CPA firm group.  This procedure eliminates 137 observations, leaving a total of 
363 observations in the reduced Small CPA firm group.  We then re-estimated the 
proportion of audits disclosing reportable conditions and material weaknesses and find 
that for the reduced Small CPA firm group the proportion audits disclosing reportable 
conditions increases to 17.08 percent, while the proportion of audits with reportable  
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conditions that also disclose material weaknesses increases to 27.42 percent.  Tests of 
difference in population proportions indicate that these proportions (17.08 percent and 
27.42 percent) are significantly higher than those obtained for the Big Four CPA firms 
(16.64 percent and 26.96 percent, respectively).  Thus, the inclusion of second-tier 
auditors in the sample seems to be acting as a confounding factor in the univariate 
analyses of this study.       
  The ordered logit regression results are presented in Table 3, which were 
estimated using all observations in the sample (n = 1,191).  The results are significant 
when taken as a whole (chi-square = 45.77; p-value < .001) and the model has a pseudo r-
square of 5.70 percent.  The estimated regression coefficient for BIG4_CPA, the 
independent variable of interest, indicates that audits conducted by the Big Four firms are 
less likely to disclose reportable conditions or material weaknesses than are firms in the 
Small CPA group (BIG4_CPA = -0.878; p-value = 0.002).  This result lends support to 
our findings in the univariate section that audits conducted by smaller CPA firms are 
significantly more likely to disclose internal control exceptions.  These findings, 
however, contradict the general assertion from prior empirical studies that the Big Four 
CPA firms are better audit quality providers.               
The estimated coefficient for SIZE indicates that audits of larger entities are more 
likely to disclose internal control exceptions; however, this result is not statistically 
significant.  In contrast, lower risk audits are significantly less likely to disclose internal 
control exceptions, as evidenced by the negative sign of the estimated regression 
coefficient for LOW_RISK.  The estimated coefficient for MAJOR indicates that there is 
a positive relationship between the proportion of federal funds classified as major  
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program and the likelihood that the audit would disclose internal control exceptions.  The 
results for COG_AGENCY indicate that audits of nonprofit hospitals that are an assigned 
cognizant agency are more likely to disclose internal control exceptions.  However, all 
audit reports of entities with an assigned cognizant agency only reflect internal control 
exceptions in the form of reportable conditions, as discussed in the univariate statistics 
section.  Lastly, the estimated coefficient for CLIENTS indicates that audits conducted by 
CPA firms with more nonprofit healthcare organizations in their client portfolios are 
more likely to perform audits that disclose internal control exceptions.  This latter finding 
is also in accordance with our findings for the variable CLIENTS in the univariate 
analysis section.   
Concluding Remarks 
This study contributes to the literature by investigating audit quality in the 
healthcare sector.  Our analysis of post-SOX data extends the findings of prior related 
studies and contributes to their call for additional research in the audit quality arena.  The 
results of this study are timely and relevant since the healthcare sector will soon 
experience significant changes due to attempted health care reforms by the U.S. 
Congressional body.  Our results reveal that Big Four CPA firms are less likely to 
disclose internal control exceptions, challenging the findings of recent empirical studies 
indicating that the Big Four CPA firms are better audit quality providers.  But, beyond 
questioning the superiority of the Big Four CPA firms, our findings also question whether 
the distinct organizational structure of nonprofit healthcare organizations impacts the 
performance of their auditors.  We note that specialized auditor knowledge and expertise 
may be necessary when examining nonprofit healthcare organizations and, based on our  
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findings, smaller CPA firms seem to be able to perform these audits more effectively than 
the Big Four firms.   
Our results contribute to the discussion that recent regulatory changes in the for-
profit, such as SOX, and increased government oversight of the auditing profession have 
forced auditors to reevaluate their business practices (Koehn and Del Vecchio, 2004; 
Koehn and Del Vecchio, 2006; López and Peters, 2010).  These changes may contribute 
to Big Four auditors focusing more closely on internal control procedures in their for-
profit clients at the expense of lower levels of audit rigor among their nonprofit clients.  
We encourage future research to examine the characteristics of smaller CPA firms in 
order to determine factors that influence their superior ability to disclose internal control 
exceptions in audits of entities in the healthcare sector. 
Considering the millions of dollars dispensed by the U.S. federal government to 
help fund various programs in the nonprofit sector, further scrutiny of the audit quality 
differences indentified in this study is necessary.  This is particularly important when 
considering that higher audit quality may lead to a much needed level of greater oversight 
and accountability within nonprofit organizations.  Unerman and O‘Dwyer (2006) 
propose that further research is necessary to ‗help identify and develop suitable 
accountability mechanisms for a variety‘ of nonprofit organizations (p. 315).  Our focus 
on Circular A-133 audits due to the goal of the SAA to improve transparency and the 
administration of federal awards may be seen as a step toward development of an 
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    INDEX = 0    INDEX = 1    INDEX = 2    All Observations 
Variable    Mean  Median  STD    Mean  Median  STD    Mean  Median  STD    Mean  Median  STD 
                                 
BIG4_CPA    0.579  1.000  0.494    0.568  1.000  0.497    0.633  1.000  0.487    0.580  1.000  0.494 
SIZE    15.064  14.695  1.501    15.366  14.769  1.902    14.921  14.981  1.288    15.096  14.711  1.551 
LOW_RISK    0.609  1.000  0.488    0.547  1.000  0.499    0.163  0.000  0.373    0.583  1.000  0.493 
MAJOR    0.797  0.888  0.225    0.812  0.926  0.221    0.872  0.931  0.152    0.802  0.896  0.223 
COG_AGENCY    0.064  0.000  0.246    0.149  0.000  0.357    0.000  0.000  0.000    0.072  0.000  0.259 
CLIENTS    23.904  26.000  20.634    25.655  25.000  23.067    31.694  34.000  26.221    24.442  26.000  21.244 
NEW_AUDITOR    0.248  0.000  0.432    0.243  0.000  0.430    0.245  0.000  0.434    0.248  0.000  0.432 
USDA    0.308  0.000  0.462    0.277  0.000  0.449    0.449  0.000  0.503    0.310  0.000  0.463 
DOD    0.140  0.000  0.347    0.135  0.000  0.343    0.122  0.000  0.331    0.139  0.000  0.346 
HUD    0.243  0.000  0.429    0.264  0.000  0.442    0.224  0.000  0.422    0.245  0.000  0.430 
EDU    0.288  0.000  0.453    0.250  0.000  0.434    0.367  0.000  0.487    0.286  0.000  0.452 
HEALTH    0.861  1.000  0.346    0.885  1.000  0.320    0.878  1.000  0.331    0.865  1.000  0.342 
OTHER    0.388  0.000  0.488    0.453  0.000  0.499    0.490  0.000  0.505    0.401  0.000  0.490 













    Big Four            
CPA firms 
Small           
CPA firms 
  All 
Observations 
           
Prob (INDEX = 1)           0.1664          0.1640            0.1654  
Prob (INDEX = 2)           0.2696          0.2195            0.2487  







Ordered Logit Regression 
 
 
Prob (INDEX) =  β0 + β1BIG4_CPAit + β2SIZEit + β3LOW_RISKit + β4MAJORit + β5COG_AGENCit  




Variable  Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
Estimate  P-value 
       
BIG4_CPA  -/+  -0.878  0.004 
       
Control Variables       
SIZE       
LOW_RISK  -/+  0.040  0.310 
MAJOR  -  -0.757  <.0001 
COG_AGENCY  +  0.553  0.107 
CLIENTS  -  0.343  0.185 
NEW_AUDITOR  +  0.027  <.0001 
  +/-  -0.155  0.224 
Funding Source       
USDA       
DOD  -/+  0.011  0.476 
HUD  -/+  -0.261  0.175 
EDU  -/+  -0.064  0.380 
HEALTH  -/+  0.093  0.315 
  -/+  0.407  0.065 
Year       
YEAR2005       
YEAR2006  -/+  0.095  0.354 
YEAR2007  -/+  0.283  0.130 
YEAR2008    0.461  0.035 
    0.327  0.133 
Intercept (INDEX=2)       
Intercept (INDEX=1)  -/+  -4.554  <.0001 
  -/+  -2.984  0.007 
  Chi-square    45.77 
  Pr > Chi-square    <.0001 
  Pseudo R-square    5.70% 
  n    1,191 
 
 
 
 